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INTRODUCTION
Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits
his Reply Brief of Intervenor.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
§78-2-2(4).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, in pertinent part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Annotated §59-12-103(l)1, in pertinent part:
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or
charged for the following:
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and
other similar accommodations.
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-33S, in pertinent part:
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a
place. Admission includes the amount paid for the right to use
a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theatre, circus,
stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any
type of entertainment. Admission also includes the right to use
a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such

*A11 future references are to the Utah Code Annotated (1992) unless otherwise
identified.
1

charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any
such similar charge.
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-34S, in pertinent part:
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation" is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a
definite location.
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to
the tax, even though such charge includes the right of the
purchaser to participate in some activity within the place. For
example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or
self-operated device is an admission to a place of amusement.
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks,
and other places of amusement are subject to the tax. Charges
for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate rentals, etc., are
also subject to tax.
ARGUMENT DETAIL
I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE,
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Tax Commission")

states that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the appeal was allegedly
filed untimely. This Court, on its own motion, requested the parties to brief this issue. The
Court has determined that it has jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. A copy of the
Receiver's pleadings which address this issue as well as the Order issued by this Court
denying summary disposition are attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
II.

THE ISSUE OF TAXABILITY OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER SKATING AND
BATTING CAGE RECEIPTS IS NOT MOOT.
The Tax Commission states that the issue of whether the Galleria's receipts from

roller skating and batting cages are taxable is moot since, due to conflicting advice from
employees of the Tax Commission, the Tax Commission agreed to forgive the sales tax
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imposed on these activities for the audit period. However, this argument is incorrect for
several reasons.
A.

The Issue is Still Ripe Since the Tax Commission Determined that Receipts
from Roller Skating and the Batting Cages are Taxable,

The conflict between the Galleria and the Tax Commission is and has always been
whether roller skating and the use of the batting cages are taxable activities. The Tax
Commission's forgiveness of tax does not address the conflict between the parties. The Tax
Commission continues to maintain that these are taxable activities. In fact, the Tax
Commission has subsequently conducted a second audit of the Galleria, again imposing sales
tax on these activities. Furthermore, a "negligence penalty" has been assessed against the
Galleria in the second audit for alleged non-compliance with matters raised in the first
audit. Clearly, the controversy between the parties remains notwithstanding the forgiveness
of the tax for the first audit period. If the Tax Commission had ruled that the activities
were not taxable, then the controversy would be moot. Having ruled that the activities are
taxable, the issue remains ripe and is not moot.
B.

Case Law Supports a Finding that the Issue is not Moot,

The Utah Supreme Court has stated the standard for determining when an issue is
moot. In Burkett v. Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court stated:
We refrain from adjudicating issues when the underlying case
is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.
As stated above, the conflict between the parties was not resolved by the forgiveness
of the sales tax on roller skating and batting cage receipts. Consequently, a judicial
determination of the constitutionality of the sales tax statute will directly "affect the rights
3

of the litigants." The Tax Commission continues to maintain that roller skating and use of
the batting cages are taxable activities.

Since the conflict remains and a judicial

determination of the issue will affect the rights of the parties, the controversy is not moot.
C

Even if the Controversy is Otherwise Mooted. An Exception to the Mootness
Doctrine Applies to Allow Judicial Review.

Several exceptions to the mootness doctrine have been recognized by the Utah courts.
Assuming arguendo that the issue of the taxability of roller skating and batting cage receipts,
is otherwise moot, an exception to the doctrine is applicable to allow this Court to resolve
the dispute. As stated in Reynolds v. Reynolds. 788 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah App. 1990):
In addition to those cases "capable of repetition, yet
evading review," other exceptions to the mootness doctrine
include cases which "may produce irreparable injury if not
decided immediately," or where controversy continues to exist
even after the issue has become moot for the litigants.
. . . Where an exception to the mootness doctrine is
present, courts historically have exercised this discretionary
authority in "class actions, questions of constitutional
interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of a
statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings." (Citations
omitted.)
Therefore, even if the issue of taxability is arguendo moot, the controversy of whether
the Tax Commission's collection actions are constitutional continues. Additionally, since the
exception applies, this Court should exercise its authority since the case at bar involves
questions of constitutionality, validity and construction of the sales tax statute and its
application and the propriety of administrative rulings issued by the Tax Commission.
D.

Judicial Economy Demands the Issues be Resolved Now.

Finally, judicial economy favors resolving simultaneously the taxability issue for all
activities in question. The Tax Commission's attempt to prevent this Court's review of the

taxability of only roller skating and batting cage activities and not the taxability of the laser
tag game, will require this Court to needlessly return to the same issues a second time in
a second proceeding.

The Tax Commission acknowledges that if it is successful in

persuading this Court to not examine all these activities concurrently, additional litigation
will be necessary. The Tax Commission states: "This issue [of whether roller skating and
batting cage receipts are subject to sales tax] is ripe for future periods unaffected by this
appeal." Respondent's Brief at 9, fn. 3. Consequently, for judicial economy, since the issues
for all activities identified in the audit are identical, this Court should review them
simultaneously.
III.

ANY DISPUTE AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER.
The Tax Commission, while vaguely acknowledging that the term "including" can have

more than one meaning, suggests that only it can devine what the 1933 Legislature intended
by its use of the term "including." The Receiver has acknowledged that the term "including"
can be used either as a word of enlargement or as a word of limitation.

The Tax

Commission cannot know with any degree of certainty that the 1933 Legislature intending
the word "including" to be interpreted as a word of enlargement. In fact, the Attorney
General's Draft Opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit "B," specifically states that the 1933
Legislature used the word "including" as a word of limitation in the sales tax statute.
Additionally, the Tax Commission incorrectly states that unless this Court adopts its
interpretation, the rest of the statute is superfluous. This simply is not the case. A
reasonable reading of the statute, with meaning being given to all the words of the statute,
can be made using "including" as a word of limitation. As a word of limitation, the term
5

"including" can refer to the types of "amusement, entertainment or recreation" activities
subject to sales tax.
Moreover, the case law cited by the Tax Commission supports the conclusion that
"including" has more than one meaning. In State v. Montello Salt Co.. 98 P. 549, 551 (1908),
rev'd. 221 U.S. 452 (1911), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The word "including" is susceptible of different shades of
meaning. Common usage has given it different meaning. It
may be used in the sense to comprise or embrace . . .; to
confine or to contain . . . .
As noted in the Receiver's Brief, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme
Court's determination that "including" was a word of enlargement and concluded that the
term "including" had been used as a word of limitation.
Since, as stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the word "including" can reasonably be
susceptible to different meanings, it must be accorded the meaning most favorable to the
taxpayer. As stated in Grauer v. Director of Revenue. 396 P.2d 260, 264 (Kan. 1964), cited
in Respondent's Brief:
Tax statutes will not be extended by implication beyond the
clear import of language employed therein and their operation
will not be enlarged so as to include matters not specifically
embraced. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning
of a taxing act, it will be construed most favorably to the
taxpayer. (Citation omitted.) . . . [T]he general rule is that if a
taxing statute be of doubtful intent it should be construed
favorably to the taxpayer. (Citation omitted.)
Since there are reasonable alternative meanings, the Court must adopt the meaning
most favorable to the taxpayer - that the term "including" was used by the 1933 Legislature
as a word of limitation.

6

IV.

THE TAX COMMISSION CANNOT EXPAND THE LAW BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE STATUTE.
The Receiver acknowledges that the legislature can delegate to the Tax Commission

the duty to create rules and regulation implementing the legislatively enacted sales tax
statutes. However, such delegation does not permit the Tax Commission to create rules and
regulations that go beyond the scope of the legislation. Exceeding its authority, the Tax
Commission has enacted rules and regulations defining "admission" and "place of
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" that go beyond the scope that the 1933 Legislature
intended.
The Attorney General Draft Opinion (Exhibit "B") states:
[OJne of the most well-established rules of statutory
construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the rule of
strict construction must be applied against the taxing authority
and in favor of the taxpayer. Therefore, taxing statutes will not
be extended beyond the clear and reasonable interpretation of
their language and if a taxing statute is of doubtful intent, it
must be construed favorable to the taxpayer. Id at 7-8.
. . . [F]or the time being we must suffer with the present
definition of "admission" . . . The customs and practices of
society change, but unfortunately statutes are often not updated
and revised to keep up with those changes. Neither the Tax
Commission or the Attorneys General's Office has the authority
to ignore the laws of this state and tax activities beyond the
scope of those laws. The proper remedy of this dilemma must
be left to the Utah Legislature.
. . . [T]he term "admission" is strictly inclusive only of a
charge for the use of seats, tables or other similar
accommodations. Unless the "admission fee" is for this use, the
admissions tax . . . cannot be imposed. Id at 14-15.
The statute does not provide for the taxation of any entertainment or recreational
activity that does not involve the use of seats or tables. Despite numerous revisions to the
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sales tax statutes, the legislature has never seen fit to specifically define or expand the
activities that are subject to sales tax. Consequently, the Tax Commission's attempt to
expand the scope of activities subject to the tax is invalid.
By way of analogy, federal law gives guidance regarding the scope of legislative
delegation that may be given under a tax statute. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Aluminum Co.. 142 F.2d 663, 667 (3rd Cir. 1944), the court states:
It, of course, goes without saying that a . .. regulation may not
exceed the legislative intent of the [taxing statute] which it
purports to interpret for administrative purposes. If it does so
offend, it is of no effect.
Additionally, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commodore. Inc.. 135 F.2d 89,
92 (6th Cir. 1943), the court concluded:
[I]t is needless to say that what [the legislative body] did not do
by positive enactment [the tax collecting authority] cannot do by
regulations. Such regulations cannot amend the law.
See also Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores. 133 F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1943): "The Treasury
Department cannot, by interpretative regulations, make income of that which is not income
within the meaning of the revenue acts . . . ."
Consequently, with a scant statute that must be narrowly interpreted with any
ambiguities resolve in favor the Galleria, the Tax Commission's attempt to expand the
activities subject to sales tax beyond the scope of those identified in the statute are void.
As the Attorney General's Office concluded in its Draft Opinion:
Confusion, inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are
the result of applying this definition [of "admission"].
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission, like the Attorney General's
Office, is bound by the provisions of the Utah Code . . . with
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respect to admissions tax. We cannot ignore, change or
exercise authority beyond what that section allows.
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted to
include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables or
other similar accommodations. Unless a fee meets this
definition, the admission tax . . . is not applicable. If the Utah
Legislature desires, it may revise that definition to be more
inclusive of present activities. Id at 16.
If the Tax Commission seeks to have activities subjected to sales tax which are not
enumerated in the statute, it must do so by requesting the legislature to amend the statute.
Without such amendment, its current extension of sales tax to roller skating, batting cage
and laser tag receipts (none of which require the use of seats or tables) is void as
unconstitutional.
V.

THE TAX COMMISSION HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY RATIONAL BASIS
FOR ITS DETERMINATION THAT ONLY SOME IDENTIFIED ACTIVITIES ARE
SUBJECT TO SALES TAX.2
The Tax Commission makes unpersuasive and inconsistent arguments as to why it is

rational to tax only certain activities falling within the definition of places of "amusement,
entertainment, or recreation." Each of these arguments are meritless.
A*

The Tax Commission Requests this Court to Determine that the Statute is
Broad in Scope Yet Limited by Arbitrary Application.

2

The Tax Commission states that constitutional issues were not raised in previous
proceedings. However, this is not the case. The constitutional issues of vagueness, due
process and equal treatment were repeatedly expressed by the Galleria in previous
proceedings. By way of example, the Receiver directs the Court's attention to R. 12, 27, 49,
50, 52, 66, 67, 85, 123, 124, 145, and 186. Additionally, the Receiver directs the Court's
attention to the Hearing Transcript 3, 16, 21 and 38.
9

The Tax Commission has requested that this Court adopt a schizophrenic approach
to the interpretation of the sales tax statute. The Respondent's Brief repeatedly requests
this Court to adopt a broad meaning of the terms "admissions" and "including."
For example:
The phrase "admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation" is broad. Id. at 11.
The words "amusement, entertainment, or recreation" are
generic, and do not refer to any specific transaction. This broad
statement of legislative purpose using generic terms is evidence
that the enacting legislature intended that unmentioned
transactions are subject to taxation. Id at 12.
Yet, on the other hand, the Tax Commission states that this broad definition of activities
subject to sales tax is not so broad so as to include bowling, miniature golf, golf, driving
ranges, tennis courts or racquetball courts. Clearly, these arguments of convenience, are
disingenuous. The Tax Commission should not be permitted to adopt one meaning of the
statute when convenient and reject this same meaning when not helpful to its position.
B.

There is No Rational Basis the Tax Commission's Taxing Policies,

The obvious and undisputed purpose of the sales tax statute is to raise revenue.
There is no rational basis, nor justification, for concluding that the 1933 Legislature only
intended to tax certain activities falling within the definition of activities subject to the tax.
In fact, such a conclusion, which the Tax Commission seeks that this Court adopt, is
meritless. Without a rational basis for distinguishing between taxed and non-taxed activities,
the statute as applied is unconstitutional.
In an attempt to find a rational basis for distinguishing between activities, the Tax
Commission states:
10

[T]he Commission held that admissions to both the batting cage
and laser tag were taxable because they occurred within an
"enclosed area." The Commission found roller skating taxable
because it was specifically mentioned in an administrative rule.
Accordingly, the Commission's rules and decision rest upon
paid entrance into a specific place. (Emphasis in original.)
Respondent's Brief at 14-15.
Clearly, this argument cannot be supported. If the imposition of the tax is based on
admittance to an "enclosed area," other recreational activities in a much more enclosed area
must also be subject to the sales tax. As the Receiver pointed out in his Brief, a racquetball
court, for which an entrance fee is charged, is a much more "enclosed area" than is the
batting cage. Yet the Tax Commission seeks to persuade this Court that only the admission
to the less defined area of the batting cage or the roller skating rink falls within the
definition of "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation," while
admission to a racquetball court (a windowless, rectangular enclosure with four cement walls
and a small door generally requiring crouching to gain entrance) does not.3 The Tax
Commission's arguments are meritless and as applied, the sales tax statute is
unconstitutional as arbitrary, capricious and lacking any rational basis in application.

3

The Tax Commission apparently believes that a comparison of the discriminatory taxing
practices of the Tax Commission is a request for an advisory opinion. The Receiver does
not seek a determination of whether racquetball or tennis are taxable activities, rather, only
seeks to point out to the Court the discriminatory application of the statute. Clearly,
pointing out how other parties are being treated vis a vis the complaining party is essential
to any equal protection argument. If a court could not look to the treatment of other
parties not before the court, no court could ever find equal protection violations since it is
that comparison that justifies a finding of unconstitutionality.
11

CONCLUSION • RELIEF SOUGHT
The Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that none of the activities
conducted at the Galleria are subject to the collection and payment of Utah Sales Tax.
In the alternative, if this Court should find, by adopting the Tax Commission's broad
interpretation of the sales tax statute, that the activities conducted at the Galleria are
subject to sales tax, the Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that the Tax
Commission's methods of collection are unconstitutional since these actions discriminate,
without any rational basis, among activities clearly falling within the definition (as defined
by the Tax Commission) of activities subject to sales tax.
DATED this | g^day of June, 1993.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Stephen W. Rupp
Attorneys for Intervenor
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Stephen W. Rupp (3824)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Alan V. Funk, Intervenor
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
49th STREET GALLERIA,
AND
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS'
JURISDICTION

vs.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent,
vs.
No. 930053-CA
ALAN V. FUNK, COOPERS & LYBRAND,
Intervenor.

Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits
his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court of Appeals'
Jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether (i) the actual issuance date of a final order by the Utah State Tax
Commission or (ii) the deemed denial date, governs the commencement of the 30 day
period for requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992)?
STATEMENT OF CASE
In the spring of 1984, The 49th Street Galleria (the "Galleria") opened for business
in Murray City, Utah.
Admission to the Galleria is free with charges being imposed for each of the activities
in which a patron desires to participate. Additionally, patrons of the Galleria are free to
use without charge, numerous tables, chairs and benches located throughout the Galleria.
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Audit Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission (the 'Tax Commission") to make a determination of whether the planned
recreational activities would be subject to Utah Sales Tax.
In May of 1984, Kenneth Cook of the Tax Commission informed the Galleria that
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating would be subject to Utah Sales Tax.
Believing the previous determination was inaccurate and/or poorly reasoned, the
Galleria requested an additional review of its operations by the Tax Commission.
On August 2, 1984, George M. Loertscher, Office Auditor of the Tax Commission,
informed the Galleria that the batting cages, miniature golfing, roller skating, bowling and
speed pitching (radar gun) were not subject to sales tax, however the rental of equipment
2

was subject to such tax.
Believing this information to be the definitive word, the Galleria did not collect sales
tax on any of the activities identified in Loertscher's letter.
At the request of the Galleria, the Tax Commission requested the Attorney's General
Office to prepare an opinion regarding the application of sales tax to the Galleria's
activities.
An "Informal Opinion" was prepared by the Attorney's General Office in September,
1985. The conclusions of the report were unfavorable to the Tax Commission's current
methods of imposition and collection of sales tax and the Tax Commission requested the
Attorney's General Office to reconsider the matter. Thereafter, no formal opinion was
prepared or released.
Subsequent to its opening, the Galleria added a laser chase game to its activities
portfolio.
Based on Loertscher's letter that no other activities in the Galleria were subject to
sales tax, the Galleria reasonably believed that the laser chase game was also not subject
to sales tax.
In late 1989 or early 1990, the Tax Commission audited the Galleria and assessed
additional sales tax on the Galleria's receipts from its batting cages, amusement rides, roller
skating rink, laser chase game and food sales.
On November 20,1991, the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
3

of Law and Final Decision confirming the prior decision that receipts from the Galleria's
batting cages, roller skating rink and laser chase game were taxable. (R. 71.)
On December 10, 1991, the Galleria timely filed Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration. (R. 64.)
On January 3, 1992, the Utah Attorney's General Office, on behalf of the Auditing
Division of the Tax Commission, filed Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's
Petition for Reconsideration. (R. 54.)
On January 21, 1992, the Galleria filed Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Reconsideration. (R. 48.)
On March 10,1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order (the "Order") (a copy
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") denying Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration.
(R. 42.)
On April 7, 1992, 28 days after issuance of the final Order, the Galleria timely filed
its Petition for Review of Order with the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 40.)
ARGUMENT
I.

JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IS APPROPRIATE SINCE THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED.
A.

The Plain Meaning of the Statute Provides that the Petition for Review was
Timely Filed.

Statutory law requires that a petition for judicial review be filed within 30 days of the
final agency action. The determinative statute, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992),
4

provides:
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting
the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been
issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, the Galleria's Petition for Review (the "Petition") was timely filed. The "final
agency action" (the Order denying the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration of the alleged
tax obligation) was issued on March 10,1992. (R. 42.) On April 7, 1992, only 28 days after
the final agency action, the Galleria filed its Petition, well within the 30 day period provided
by the statute. (R. 40.) Therefore, the Petition was timely filed in full compliance with the
statutory provisions. Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction over the Galleria's appeal.
B.

The Tax Commission's Actual Order Denying the Request for
Redetermination of the Tax Commission Should Control Over any Deemed
Denial,

The issue of compliance with Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992) where the Tax
Commission actually issued an order constituting the final agency action after the date that
the Tax Commission is deemed to have denied the request for redetermination, is
apparently an issue of first impression. The Tax Commission argues that in the event that
no order granting or denying the request for reconsideration is issued within 20 days of the
request, the 30 period in which to request a judicial review, commences upon the expiration
of the 20 day period, regardless of the actions taken by the parties thereafter. However, a
more reasoned approached would conclude the opposite.

5

In Dustv's v. Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992), the Utah
Supreme Court placed great weight on the "Notice" provision contained in the final order
of the Tax Commission. This "Notice" provision is substantially identical to the one
contained in the Order received by the Galleria on March 10, 1992. This provision
provides:
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order
[the Order provides: "after the date of final order"] to file in
Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann.
§§63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-14(2)(a).
Analyzing this provision, the court concluded:
For . . . the guidance of all those who petition for judicial
review from agency action, we hold that the date the order
constituting the final agency actions issues is the date the order
bears on its face.
To summarize, Dusty's time to seek judicial review . . .
requir[ed] it to file its petition for judicial review within thirty
days after the order constituting final agency action was issued.
The order was issued on the date it bore on its face. Id. at 9.
Applying this standard as enunciated by the Supreme Court, clearly the final agency
action occurred on March 10, 1992 when the Tax Commission issued its final Order.
Certainly, the Tax Commission must admit that the deemed denial date was not the final
agency action. "An agency order is not final so long as it reserves something for further
decision by the agency." Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29
(Utah App. 1992). Therefore, the deemed denial date could not constitute final agency

6

action (thereby commencing the running of the 30 day period for requesting judicial review)
since, as the record shows, on March 10, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order.
Through that date, the Tax Commission had "reserved something for further decision."
After the issuance of the final Order, the Tax Commission, then and only then, relinquished
all jurisdiction to the Galleria's appeal of the alleged sales tax liability.
As stated both by the Dusty's court and the Notice as contained in the Order, the
Galleria had 30 days from March 10, 1992 to file its petition for judicial review. Having
filed its petition for judicial review on April 7, 1992, only 28 days after final agency action,
the request was timely. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the Galleria's appeal
on the merits.
C.

The Parties, by Their Actions, Extended the Deadline Upon Which the
Request for Reconsideration was Deemed Denied,

While the Receiver acknowledges that the 30 day period in which to request judicial
review cannot be waived or extended by the consent of the parties, any other time period
prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 46b) (including the period in
which a request for reconsideration is deemed denied) can be extended. See Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-l(9) (1992).
Clearly by their actions, all parties intended to (and did) extend the time period in
which the request for reconsideration was deemed denied. The Petitioner's Request for
Reconsideration was filed by the Galleria on December 10, 1991. Assuming arguendo that
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the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statute is correct, the Request for
Reconsideration was deemed denied 20 days later, December 30, 1991. According to the
Tax Commission's interpretation, upon this deemed denial date, the rights and obligations
of the parties became fixed. If in fact this deemed denial constituted the final agency action
for purposes of filing a petition for judicial review, neither the Attorney's General Office
nor the Tax Commission would have any need or obligation to proceed with the Request
for Reconsideration. Yet the actions of both the Attorney's General Office and the Tax
Commission suggest that neither considered the deemed denial to constitute final agency
action.
On January 3, 1992, the Attorney's General Office filed Respondent's Brief in
Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration with the Tax Commission. Clearly
the Attorney's General Office didn't considered the deemed denial date as governing since
its opposition was filed four days after the deemed denial date. If the matter was closed
and the request denied, as the Attorney's General Office now asserts, why then was there
any need to file its opposition after the matter was allegedly closed.
Additionally, on March 10, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order denying
the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration.

Under the Attorney's General Office

interpretation of the statute, the Galleria's request was moot after December 30, 1991. In
fact, under this interpretation, the Tax Commission would no longer even have jurisdiction
over the matter after the deemed denial date. The Attorney's General Office interpretation
8

is clearly erroneous.
The Tax Commission had jurisdiction over the Galleria's tax dispute through the
issuance of the final Order on March 10, 1992. Had the Tax Commission ruled positively
on the Request for Reconsideration, the Attorney's General Office would not argue that the
Tax Commission no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the matter after the deemed denial
date. Therefore, the deemed denial is but a presumption that is completely rebutted by the
actions of the parties. Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction since the petition for judicial
review was filed 28 days after the final Order was issued by the Tax Commission.
CONCLUSION
Within 28 days of the issuance of the final Order by the Tax Commission, the
Galleria timely filed its Petition for Review of Order with the Utah Supreme Court.
Additionally, the actions of the parties show an intent to extend the period in which the Tax
Commission could respond to the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration past the deemed
denial date. Therefore, since the Galleria fully complied with the law, this Court has
jurisdiction.
DATED this

day of April, 1993.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

Stephen W. Rupp
Attorneys for Intervenor
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
Appeal No, 90-1055

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH ST\TE TAX COMMISSION,

Account No. D14926
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dazed December 10, 1991, filed
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision
dated November 20, 1991.
FINDINGS
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that
a

Petition

for

Reconsideration

"will

allege

as

grounds

for

reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery
of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise
its

discretion

Reconsideration.
Reconsideration

in

granting

or

denying

a

Petition

for

The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for
are

discussed

below,

in

the

order

of

their

presentation.
2.

Petitioner argues that because it was advised by

Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that

Appeal No. 90-1055

its laser chase game was also not taxable.

Petitioner's argument

overlooks the fact that it had also been advised by others on the
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax.
Petitioner chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the
contrary advice.

Then, without further discussion of the matter

with Audit Division staff, Petitioner concluded that the laser
chase game was also not subject to tax.
not

existed

when

Audit

Division

The laser chase game had

staff

initially

reviewed

Petitioner's operation.
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive
application

of

sales tax to those specific

activities where

Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of
Audit Division staff.

Petitioner did not receive conflicting

advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game.

The

Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase
game is subject to sales tax.
3.

Petitioner also contends the Commission did not

respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which
sales tax was imposed on Petitioner's various activities.

In

effect, Petitioner argues that such rules exceed the scope of
Utah's Sales Tax Act.

The Commission recognizes that payment of

sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Gales
Tax Act. However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules
in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed
-2-
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by the Act.

(See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.) The rules upon which

the assessment was made in this case are an application of the
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the
contrary.

The Commission therefore finds no meri-c in Petition's

challenge to those rules.
4.

Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1 ) (f) of the

Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague.

Petitioner has

framed its objections in conclujsionary language, with no citation
of authority and minimal analysis.
rejects

Petition's

The Commission therefore

challenge -co the constitutionality

of the

statute and rules.
5. Petitioner further argues that no logical distinction
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax,
and batting cages, which are subject to tax.

The Commission

recognizes

activities

that

distinctions

difficult to draw.

between

the

two

are

The exemption of bowling from sales tax is

largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at
the issue were possible.

Even so, the fact that receipts from

bowling may have been excluded farom taxation for historical reasons
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded;
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the
Sales Tax Act.
-3-
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6.

The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid

other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject
of this appeal.

The Petitioner did not pursue such a position

during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for
refund been submitted.

Petitioner may claim such a refund in the

manner provided by law and regulation.
7.

Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's

misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General.

Petitioner contends

the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to
Petitioner's position.

First# the so called opinion is merely a

draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General
and never accepted by the Commission.

Second, the Commission has

made no effort to conceal the draft. The Petitioner has a copy of
the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter.
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has
rejected its conclusions for the reasons stated in the Commission's
original decision.

.-4_
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DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of
the Utah State Tax Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration
is denied.

It is so ordered.

DATED this

/n^1

day of

^ry-X-

, 1992.

DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

sO (hiawitfju0±
>e B. Pacheco
Commissioner

/

S. Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code
Ann. §§63-4613-13(1), 63-46b-14 ( 2) (a) .
,<^>77T>^
ANsd/90-1U55.ord

CO \

it
X-'

•>" < v :
h 0.

"v
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
49th Street Galleria
c/o LaVar Christensen
4998 South 360 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84123
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wel3 s Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div,
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED.this

/ ^

day of ^ p ^ y ^ X

/ 1992.

Z^^?^^^<<^^xr7?-^

Secreta
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Stephen W. Rupp (3824)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Alan V. Funk, Intervenor
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
49th STREET GALLERIA,

SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF UTAH COURT
OF APPEALS'
JURISDICTION

Petitioner,
vs.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent,
vs.

No. 930053-CA

ALAN V. FUNK, COOPERS & LYBRAND,
Intervenor.

Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits
his Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court of
Appeals' Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether (i) the actual issuance date of a final order by the Utah State Tax

Commission or (ii) the deemed denial date, governs the commencement of the 30 day
period for requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992)?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 26, 1993, this Court requested the parties to brief the issue of

whether this Court had jurisdiction to consider the Receiver's petition for judicial review.
2.

The single issue with regards to jurisdiction is whether the deemed denial date

or the actual final agency action (if after the deemed denial date) should govern for
purposes of commencing the 30 day period allowed for requesting judicial review.
ARGUMENT
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RECENTLY REJECTED THE TAX COMMISSIONS5
ARGUMENT THAT THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PERIOD COMMENCES ON THE
DEEMED DENIAL DATE WHEN A FINAL ORDER IS ISSUED THEREAFTER,
In the matter currently before this Court, the Tax Commission has made the
argument that the deemed denial date should commence the period in which a party can
request judicial review, even if a final agency order is issued after the deemed denial date.
This argument was recently rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case Harper
Investments. Inc. et. al. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. Supreme
Court No. 920310, currently before the Supreme Court, the Tax Commission argued that the
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction since the period in which the taxpayer could request
judicial review had expired based on the deemed denial date. See Reply Memorandum, p.
3-4, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." However, the Supreme Court
2

rejected this argument and denied the Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.

A copy of the Supreme Court's denial of the Tax

Commission's motion is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
Consequently, this Court should also find that it appropriately has jurisdiction to
review the above-reference matter and thereby reject the Tax Commission's argument that
the period to seek judicial review commences on the deemed denial date when a final order
is issued after the deemed denial date.
CONCLUSION
The precedent of the Utah Supreme Court should be followed by this Court in
finding that it appropriately has jurisdiction when a petition for review is timely filed after
a final order is issued regardless of a statutory deemed denial date.
DATED this J ^ day of May, 1993.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

?p" \
Stephen W. R/
Attorneys forflnjervenor

3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court
of Appeals' Jurisdiction was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Lavar F. Christensen
7050 Union Park Ave., Suite 420
Midvale, UT 84047
Attorneys for Petitioner
Rick L. Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 south State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Respondent

fllIl~&Ui&.

JAN C. GRAHAM (#1231)
Attorney General
CLARK L. SNELSON (#4673)
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3200
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
HARPER
HARPER
HARPER
HARPER

INVESTMENTS, INC.,
SAND AND GRAVEL, INC.,
EXCAVATING, INC., and
CONTRACTING, INC.,

]
)
)
]

REPLY MEMORANDUM

Petitioners,
vs.

]

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

1 Supreme Court No. 920310

Respondent.

The Utah State Tax Commission, hereinafter
"Respondent", submits this Memorandum in reply to the
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue this Court must decide is whether an
administrative agency, by accepting a tardy petition for
reconsideration, can extend or revive a right to appeal beyond
the thirty day limit stated in Utah Code Ann- § 63-46b-14(3)(a).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutes are determinative of this motion:
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-I4(3)(a) which requires an appeal to be
filed within 30 days of a final agency action; Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-13(1)(a) which permits a petition for reconsideration of
final agency action to be filed within 20 days of such action;
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) which provides an administrative
agency with the authority to lengthen or shorten any of the time
periods in the Administrative Procedures Act, "except those
periods established for judicial review."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TIME FOR SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS NOT TOLLED AND
CANNOT BE EXTENDED.

A.

The January 9, 1992 decision was final after 30 days.
Utah Code Ann. 59-1-504 states:
The action of the Commission on the taxpayer's
Petition for Redetermination of Deficiency shall
be final 30 days after the date of mailing of the
Commission's Notice of Agency Action. All tax,
interest, and penalties are due 30 days from the
date of mailing unless taxpayer seeks judicial
review.

Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) sets the requirements for judicial review
of final agency action.

That section states:

A party shall file a Petition for Judicial
Review of Final Agency Action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting
the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issued under
Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).

2

The order is issued when signed by the Commission.

Dustv/s

Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992).
Section 63-46-13 allows a party to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date
that an order is issued/' "if the order would otherwise
constitute final agency action."

Under § 63-46-13(3)(b) an Order

denying a Request for Reconsideration is deemed to be issued 20
days after the filing of the request if no action is taken by the
commission.

Petitioner failed to file a Request for

Reconsideration within 20 days as required by § 63-46b-13,
therefore that clause does not aid Petitioner.
Even if the Commission could extend the time period for
filing for reconsideration and thus extend the time for judicial
review, Petitioner's appeal is untimely under the language of
these controlling statues.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l3(3)(b)

states than Order denying a Petition for Reconsideration is
deemed to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if no
action is taken by the Commission.

Petitioners filed their

Motion for Reconsideration on May 4, 1992.
was taken by the Commission within 20 days.

(R. 11)

No action

Therefore, pursuant

to § 63-46b-13(3)(b), an Order was deemed to have issued denying
the motion on May 25, 1992. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b14(3)(a), Petitioners "shall file a Petition for Judicial Review
3

within 30 days after the date the Order . . . is considered to
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)."

Therefore,

even under Petitioner's theory that the Commission could extend
the time for judicial review by issuing an Order on their
untimely Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioners would have had
to appeal the Order that was deemed to have issued by June 25,
1992.

Petitioner did not file until July 1, 1992. (R. 2)

Therefore, even if the Commission could extend the time for
judicial review, Petitioner did not file timely.
The provisions of §§ 63-46b-13(3)(b) are tied to the
provisions of § 63-46b-14(3)(a) in order to insure that a Motion
for Reconsideration cannot indefinitely delay the time for filing
an appeal.

The court should therefore strictly enforce the time

limit set forth therein.
B.

The Tax Commission's hearing of the Petitioners' tardy
petition for reconsideration does not render the January 9th
decision not final for purposes of filing an appeal.
Federal Courts have long recognized the rule that tardy

motions for reconsideration cannot toll the statute of
limitations governing appeals even if the trial court hears the
motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit, stated the following concerning a tardy petition
for reconsideration:
[I]n order to extend the time for appeal a
4

motion for reconsideration must be timely.
* * *

That the District Court nonetheless
considered the motion cannot affect the
timeliness of the appeal; the District Court
is without power to enlarge the time for
making Rule 59(e) motions.
Denley v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 F. 2d 39, 41 (6th Cir.
1984).

Other Federal Courts have reached similar conclusions.

In Smith V. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 157 (3rd Cir. 1988); the court
found "An untimely motion, even if acted upon by the district
court, cannot toll the time for filing a notice of appeal." See
Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc., 804 F.2d 613, 617 (11th Cir.
1986); Gribble v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1173, 1174 (5th. Cir. 1980).
Likewise, in Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818, 820
(7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit stated in regards to an
untimely motion for a new trial:
The district court's assuming to hear and
determine a belated motion for a new trial
cannot thereby affect the finality of the
judgment and enlarge the time for taking an
appeal. (Emphasis added)•
The court In Martinez declined to look beyond the technical time
requirements of filing an appeal.

Rather, the court noted that

"important substantive policies regarding the finality of
judgments . . . " existed which prevented the court from ignoring
the technical requirements associated with filing an appeal.
5

Id.

The uniform holdings running throughout these Federal cases
is that statute of limitations on appeals cannot be stayed by a
tardy post trial petition even if it is heard by the trial court.
These holdings reinforce the common sense notion that one cannot
"toll" the running of a limitations period by actions taken after
the period has run.

Under the clear language of § 59-12-504, the

Commission's Order became final since judicial review was not
sought within 30 days of the date of issuance.

The actions of

Petitioner after the running of the limitations period cannot
serve to "toll" the period.
Section 63-46b-l(9) relied on by Petitioner is consistent
with the holdings of the federal cases as cited in prohibiting
the agency from extending the time for judicial review.

Since

the period was not tolled prior to the Order becoming final, and
cannot be extended by the Commission pursuant to the express
language of the statute, Petitioner's appeal is untimely and
should be dismissed.
II.

THE PETITIONERS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THEY DID NOT
RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE JANUARY 9, 1992 DECISION.
Petitioners have argued in their memorandum in

opposition to the motion to dismiss that they did not receive
notice of the January 9, 1992 decision.

However, the April 15,

1992 order granting the Petitioner's permission to file a tardy
petition for reconsideration noticeably did not contain any
6

findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Thus, there has been no

specific finding by the Tax Commission that the petitioners' did
not receive notice. (R. 30).
The record clearly indicates that notice of the January
9, 1992 decision was sent to the Petitioners' Attorneys.

See

Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition to Petitioners' Motion &
Memorandum to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal.

The

evidence also indicates that the Petitioners' Attorneys may have
received notice since they timely responded to the following
documents with similar mailing certificates as the January 9,
1992 decision:

The Respondents Answer to Petitioners' Petition

for Redetermination, dated January 10, 1991 (R.667); the Tax
Commission's Prehearing Order, March 28, 1991 (R.660); The
Stipulation Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Dates, June 14,
1991 (R.275); and finally, the Notice of Hearing, March 28, 1991
(R.656).
The notices were mailed to the attention of Thomas Nelson of
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy since Mr. Nelson filed
the Petitions with a letter to the Tax Commission identifying
himself as the Petitioners' representative and asking that
verification of filing be sent to his attention.

(R.668)

Petitioners' made no request to have the mailing certificate
changed following Mr. Nelson's departure from the firm despite
7

the fact that the other correspondence from the Commission had
come addressed to him.

The affidavits filed by Respondent

establish that the notice was timely mailed to the same address
as other correspondence received by Petitioner.

It is fair to

assume that the Order was received and that Petitioner's failure
to respond was due to miscommunication caused by Mr. Nelson
leaving the firm rather than by the post office failing to
deliver the mail.
CONCLUSION
The hearing of a tardy petition for reconsideration had no
effect on the finality of the January 9, 19 9 2 Order.

To conclude

otherwise would grant the Tax Commission power to extend the time
period for seeking judicial review.

Section 63-46b-l(a) relied

on by Petitioner clearly states that the Commission's Order
cannot have that effect.

The Order became final prior to

Petitioner taking any action which could be construed to toll the
running of the time for filing for judicial review.

Therefore,

Petitioner's appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of February, 1993.

CLARK L. SNELSON
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM on this

/<T "^day of February,

1993 by first class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Robert A. Peterson
Richard C. Skeen
Robert w. Payne
Attorneys for Petitioners
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Secretary
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

APR * 1 1595.
April 20, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

V-'J-EY GENERAL
•.':.• CAPITOL

Clark !*• Snelson
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
36 S. State, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Harper
Harper
Harper
Harper

Investments, Inc.,
Sand and Gravel, Inc.,
Excavating, Inc., and
Contracting, Inc.,
Petitioners,

v.
Auditing Division, Utah State
Tax Commission,
Respondent.

No. 920310
902158-902161

Respondent's motion for summary disposition is hereby
denied, and the court reserves its ruling on the issues for
further consideration upon plenary presentation.
Whereas the appellant's-brief has been filed, the
appellee's brief is due May 20, 1993.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

FSLED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAY 1 \ 1993
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ftL^/(6>c
</•
'

M*ryT. Noonan
Cierk of the Court

00O00

The 49th Street Galleria,
ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No, 930053-CA
v.
Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission,
Respondent.

This matter is before the court on its own notice of
consideration for summary disposition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary disposition is denied and
a ruling on the issues raised is deferred until plenary
presentation and consideration of the case. Utah R. App. P.
10(f).
Dated this

W

day of May, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

yaZ&/^&C_
Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 1993, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
LaVar F. Christensen
Attorney at Law
7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite #420
Midvale, UT 84047
Stephen W. Rupp
McKay, Burton & Thurman, Suite 12 00
Attorneys at Law
Kennecott Building - 10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Jan Graham
State Attorney General
John C. McCarrey
Assistant Attorney General
3 6 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 13th day of May, 1993.

By -i)KW\ '/WllW
Deputy dlerk
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September 6, 1985

Mr. Mark K. Buchi, Chairman
Utah State Tax Commission
Heber M. Wells Office Building
160 East 3 00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
RE:

Attorney General Opinion No. 85-40
Taxability of Admission and Special Events Fees

Dear Mr. Buchi:
The following Informal Opinion is in response to your
letter of May 24, 1985, wherein you requested guidance as to the
taxation of admission fees.

This Opinion will set forth the

fundamental rules that should govern the taxation of admissions
receipts and then suggest changes in Tax Commission policy that
will provide consistent application of the law.
PACTS
In Utah, "amount (s) paid for admission to any place of
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" are subject to sales
tax.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(d).

Further, the definition of

"admission" states that it "includes seats and tables reserved or
otherwise, and other similar accommodations and charges made
therefore."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9).

While at first blush

it appears that the application of these legislative provisions
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would be simple, problems surrounding the "admissions tax" have
burdened the Tax Commission and its staff for many years.
For example, the Tax Commission presently imposes the
admissions tax on charges made for swimming pool use, skating
rink fees, and amusement park rides.

However, golfing green

fees, receipts from bowling alleys, and court fees (tennis,
racquetball, squash, etc.) are not taxed.

According to the Tax

Commission, the reason for distinguishing the above-categorized
activities is not necessarily grounded in legal reasoning;
rather, it is the result of varying practices and interpretations
of successive administrations which, over the years, have rooted
themselves i,nto the policies of the Commission.

Further, the

legislative provision that defines "admission" and the Tax
Commission Rule that defines "place of amusement, entertainment,
or recreation" are nebulous and difficult to apply in practical
situations, thus adding to the confusion surrounding the
admissions tax.
The difficulty of these problems has made the
application of the admissions tax unclear in new amusement
situations such as batting cages, video arcades, and the like.
Therefore, this Ooinion was requested by the Commission so than
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an understandable statement of th'e law can be consistently and
correctly applied with regard to the admissions tax.
Throughout this Opinion/ reference is made to the
phrase "seats and tables reserved or otherwise/ and other similar
accommodations. " For purposes of brevity, we have generically
referred to this entire quotation as "seats and tables" or
"seats/tables."

However/ we imply therein that all such seats

and tables, reserved or otherwise, and other similar
accommodations (benches/ stoolsf bleachers/ etc.) are included.
Likewise/ we have used "amusement activity" to refer to the
phrase;"place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation."
ISSUE
What are the principles and standards for determination
with respect to the admissions tax?
DISCUSSION
A.

Introduction

The "admissions tax" was promulgated as part of the
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933.

Other than changes in the taxing

rate, the language of the provision has remained suDstantially
the same:
paid:

"[T]here is levied and there shall be collected and

(d) A tax . . . of the amount paid for admission to any

00000154

Mark K. Buchi
September 6, 1985
Page Four

Informal Opinion No. 85-40

place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation,"
Ann- S 59-15-4 (d) •
in Utah Code A m u

Utah Code

The term "admission" is legislatively defined

section 59-15-2(9):

"•Admission1 includes

seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar
accommodations and charges made therefore, "

For the most part,

the problems which face us in applying the admissions tax stem
from the determination of what constitutes an "admission."
Since the controlling source of law in this issue is
the Utah Code's applicable provisions sections 59-15-4(d) and 5 915-2(9), the major question to be decided is whether the Utah
Legislature intended to strictly limit "admission" to only
include activities where the participant uses "seats and tables"
to enjoy "amusement, entertainment, or recreation/ or if
itemizing the use of seats and tables is merely an example of one
type of an "admission-"

If the former is true, then the current

Tax Commission practice of taxing the receipts from swimming pool
and skating rink charges is improper.

However, if the latter is

true, then the Tax Commission may be in error by not taxing some
activities that should be subject to the tax (e.g., green fees,
bowling receipts, and court fees).
B.

Analysis of Utah Statutes
Since the subject legislative provisions were handed

down as law in 1933, no written documentation of legislative
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history is available to aid in determining the legislature's
intent (written documentation begins in 1953) . Therefore, to
determine the intent of the Utah Legislature, we must apply
accepted rules of statutory construction.
The Utah Legislature's definition of "admissions"
states that "admission inclndes."

As noted earlier, the question

we must resolve is whether the term "includes" should be a term
of enlargementr indicating that an "admission" could be something
else besides the charge for use of seats or tables; or whether
the tenti "includes" should be a word of limitations where an
admission could only be that situation where seats/ tables, or
similar accommodations were used in order to enjoy the amusement
activity.
A majority of court holdings state that the word
"includes" is a word of expansion and enlargement and not one of
restriction or limitation. £££, e.g. , Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw.
25, 564 P.2d 135, (1977); Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo.
216, 533 P.2d 1129, (1975); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 24 111. App.3d 718, 321 M.E. 2d 293 (1974).

Neverthe-

less, considering the context in which the word is used, it can
be and often is a word of limitation.

Se^/ e.g./ Premier

Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or. 123, 400 P.2d 227 (1965).
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In State v. Monticello Salt Company, 98 P. 549, 34 Utah 458
(190 8), the Utah Supreme court stated that:
The word "including/" according to common usage,
is susceptible to different shades of meaning.
It may be used in the sense to comprise or
embrace; to confine or to contain; to express
the idea that a thing in question constitutes a
part only of the contents of some other thing;
as a word of enlargement, and ordinarily implying that something else has been given beyond
the general language which precedes it; to add
to the general clause a species which does not
naturally belong to it. It is frequently used
as the equivalent of "also."
Therefore, in Dtah, the use of the word "includes" is not
apositive as to whether the term "admissions" as used in section
59-15-2(9) is exclusive or exemplary of an admission. We must
examine the context of the usage and other factors to determine
the meaning of the word "includes. "
First, the only item listed as an admission is the
charge for seats and tables, as opposed to a common usage of
"includes" as a term of enlargement where a list of several items
are given as an example of what the term means.

Second, we

should note that the phrase "and other similar accommodations" is
modifying the nouns seats or tables and not modifying the term
"admission" itself, which would indicate that "includes" was used
as a term of enlargement.

Third, nowhere in the definition is it
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stated that the term includes seats or tables, but is not limited
to charges for seats and tables*

Fourth/ had the legislature

intended that the term "admission" would mean something more than
the charge for seats and tables, it could have easily stated
otherwise.

Finally, considering the time when the definition of

"admission" and the admission tax itself were promulgated, using
the common base of seats and tables as the standard for
determining whether an activity was an admission was likely
reasonable.

Video arcades, batting cages, public golf courses,

etc., were non-existent in 1933.

The major source of amusement

and entertainment was the theater, picture shows, and sporting
events.

Defining admission as a charge made for seats and

tables, therefore, was adequate.
These factors indicate that the term "includes" should
be a term of limitations and the Utah Legislature's intent was to
limit the admissions tax applicability to only those activities
wherein seats and tables were necessary to the enjoyment of the
amusement activity.
Moreover, one of the most well-established rules of
statutory construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the
rule of strict construction must be applied against the taxing
authority and in favor of the taxpayer.

Therefore, taxing
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statutes will not be extended beyond the clear and reasonable
interpretation of their language and if a taxing statute is of
doubtful intent, it must be construed favorable to the taxpayer.
Sutherland Stat. Const. § 66.01 (4th Ed.).

This rule of

statutory construction is clearly applicable to the Otah
Legislative provision section 59-15-4(d) which taxes admission

Additionally, the very Tax Commission Rule (S33) that
interprets the statutory definition of "admission" limits its
substantive content and list of examples to those situations
which ,are only covered by a strictly construed intrepretation of
"admission":
a. The term "admission" means the right or
privilege to enter into a place including seats
and tables reserved or otherwise and other
similar accommodations and charges made therefor. The amount paid for the right to use a
reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium,
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting
house or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment is taxable. The right to use a table
at a night club, hotel or roof garden is taxable
whether such charge is designated as a cover
charge or any such similar charge, and the
amount paid for such right is subject: to the
tax. This is true whether the charge made for
the use of the seat, table, or similar accommodation is combined with an Admission charge
proper to form a single ciiarge, or is separate
and distinct from an admission charge, or is
itself the sole charge.
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This Sales Tax Rule implies no application of the
admissions tax to amusement activities whose fee is for other
than the use of seats and tables.
Therefore, considering all of the above factors, it is
the opinion of the Utah Attorney General that the term
"admission," as defined by the Qtah Legislature, is strictly
limited to those situations where seats, tables, or similar
seating facilities are used by the patrons to engage in the
amusement activity.

To be subject to the admissions tax of

section 59-15-4(d), the definition, as above construed, must be
satisfied.
C.

Application to Current Practice
Construing the definition of "admission" to be limited

to the charge made for use of seats, tables, etc., will require
that the Tax Commission change some of its present taxing
policies with regard to the admissions tax.

Subjecting any

activity to the admissions tax which does not require the use of
some type of seating facility is not in accord with the
restrictive definition of "admission."

If the fee cnarged is noc

an "admission" as that term is defined by section 59-15-2(9) and
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i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Opinion, then n e i t h e r can i t be an "admission
to a p l a c e of amusement, entertainment or recreation*"
The charge paid for use of a seat or t a b l e at a
t h e a t e r , movie, stadium, gymnasium, schoolhouse, nightclub, and
o t h e r s i m i l a r places i s c l e a r l y s u b j e c t to the admissions tax
Also, t h e p r i c e paid to r i d e on amusement devices located at
amusement parks, c a r n i v a l s or f a i r s i s taxable ( t h i s i s true
whether the price paid i s for an i n d i v i d u a l rid or unlimited
use) , as i s the cost of a ski l i f t

ticket.

However, p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a c t i v i t i e s such as golf,
bowling, swimming, s k a t i n g , t e n n i s , r a c q u e t b a l l , e t c . , cannot be
taxed by s e c t i o n 59-15-4(d) since they f a i l to meet the
d e f i n i t i o n of "admission" in t h a t t h e fee paid to p a r t i c i p a t e in
t h i s type of recreation i s not for the use of any seat or t a b l e .
I n c i d e n t a l use of a seat or t a b l e may occur, but fee paid for
t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s i s primarily for use of the f a c i l i t i e s .

To

comport with the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of "admission," the use of
s e a t s or t a b l e s must be necessary or customary in order to view
the amusement, entertainment, or r e c r e a t i o n .
In s i t u a t i o n s where the use of a seat and/or table i s
only p a r t i a l , the Tax Commission w i l l need to determine whether
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the use of the seat/table is incidental or necessary to enjoyment
of the activity.

If the use is incidental* then the admissions

tax will not apply; if the use is necessary, then the admissions
tax will apply.
Therefore, the restrictive term "admission" will
continue to tax many of the same activities, but will require
that the Tax Commission alter its taxing policies where they have
been imposing the admissions tax on certain participative
activities (e.g., swimming and skating).
D.

Practical Considerations
This Opinion has set forth what we believe the proper

statement of the law in Utah is, according to Utah statute, with
respect to the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-154(d) and 59-15-2(9).

However, because of the unusual manner in

which the definition of "admission" was written and the rules of
statutory construction which control, our interpretation is
narrow and, therefore, does not tax the large spectrum of
"admission fees" that for all practical reasons should be subject
to the tax.

The present standards for determination of the

admissions tax, though they be the standards we must apply, are
simply inadequate today.
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Common sense tells us that the price which a patron
pays to go swimming, skating golfing, bowling, and a host of
other charges, should logically be subject to the admissions tax.
This notion is present in Attorney General Opinion No. 7 8-259
wherein Assistant Attorney General Hark Buchi stated that it was
the duty of a state municipality to "collect a sales tax on the
admission price to the swimming pool golf curse and any other
city-owned recreation facilities."

This conclusion seemed so

clear that, other than applying section 59-15-4(d) and the Sales
Tax Regulations, no detailed analysis was done.
Further, the Tax Commission passed a Sales Tax Rule
(S47) which .states that "[clharges imposed on persons admitted to
swimming pools, skating rinks and other places of amusement are
subject to tax."

Also, in defining what the phrase "place of

amusement, entertainment, or recreation" means, the Commission
said in Sales Tax Rule S34 that "[t]he amount paid for admission
to such a place is subject to the tax even though such charge
includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some
activity within the place."

These actions on the parr of the Tax

Commission indicate that, even though hesitant about: taking the
admissions tax into.all participative activities, limiting the
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tax to only those situations where seats/tables are needed is an
arbitrary and unfair segregation of amusement and recreational
activities.
We are not the only state that has had to relegate
itself to applying a narrowly-written admissions tax.

In Graner

v. Director of Revenue, 193 Kan. 605, 396 P.2d 260 (1964), the
Kansas Supreme Court refused to impose the Kansas admissions tax
on bowling alley receipts where the tax was levied against "the
sale of admissions to any place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation."

The Kansas statutes gave no definition of the term

"admission," so the court adopted a standard dictionary
definition stating that "admission" meant "3a:
admitting:

the fact of being admitted:

enter . . . .

4:

price of entrance:

an act of

permission or right to
fee paid at or for

entering."
In response to the argument of the Kansas Attorney
General that the tax should also apply to the price charged for
participation in the recreation of bowling, the court held that
the charge for participation was not the same as a charge for
entrance to a place:
[Wlhat the legislature taxed . . . was the
price of admission to enter a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation. Had the

OOnntuaA
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legislature by its enactment intended to
impose a tax on charges for participation in
such activities as bowling, it- could have
easily done so. The fact that it did not do
so is persuasive that it was not the intention
of che legislature to impose a tax on charges
made for participation in the recreational
activities.
id* at p. 264 (emphasis in original).

The Utah Legislature's

definition of "admission" is even more limiting than the
dictionary definition adopted in Grauer, since the Grauer
standard of "fee for entrance" is even broader than Utah's "fee
for use of seats/tables."
The resolution of this tangled problem is to either:
1.

redefine the term "admission" (section 59-15-2(9)) to include

a standard meaning "price paid for entrance," as in Grauer and to
include therein "the price paid to participate in the amusement,
entertainment, or recreational activity"; or 2.

to specifically

identify in section 59-15-4(d) the activities to be covered by
the tax, stating that the list is not exclusive but exemplary.
Either of these approaches will provide a fair, understandable,
and workable statute.
However, for the time being we must suffer with the
present: definition of "admission" as it is found in section 59-

Mark K. Buchi
September 6, 1985
Page Fifteen
15-2(9).

Informal Opinion No. 85-40

The customs and practices of society change, but

unfortunately statutes are often not updated and revised to keep
up with those changes-

Neither the Tax Commission or the

Attorney General's Office has the authority to ignore the laws of
this state and tax activities beyond the scope of those laws.
The proper remedy of this dilemma must be left to the Utah
Legislature.
CONCLUSION
As defined in Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-2(9)/ the
term "admission* is strictly inclusive only of a charge for the
use of seats, tables or other similar accommodations.

Unless the

"admission fee" is for this use, the admissions tax of section
59-15-4(d) cannot be imposed.

Further, to engage in or enjoy the

amusement activity, it must be customary or necessary to use
seats, tables or other similar accommodations.
Currently, the Tax Commission is imposing the
admissions tax on the charges paid to enter a swimming pool or
skating rink.

The imposition of the admissions tax on these

charges goes beyond the taxing authority granted by section 5 915-4(d), since the charges do not meet the definition of
"admission" as described above.
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This Opinion recognizes that the definition of
"admission" which we must apply is inadequate and does not tax
many activities that should fall within the admissions tax.
Confusion, inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are the
result of applying this definition.

Nevertheless, the Tax

Commission, like the Attorney General's Office, is bound by the
provisions of the Utah code, specifically, section 59-15-2(9)
with respect to the admissions tax.

We cannot ignore, change or

exercise authority beyond what that section allows.
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted
to include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables
or other similar accommodations

Unless a fee meets this

definition, the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 59-154(d) is not applicable.

If the Utah Legislature desires, it may

revise that definition to be more inclusive of present
activities.
Sincerely,

Bryce H. P e t t e y
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
Tax & B u s i n e s s Regulation Div.
BHP/rrm
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